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FOUR-FACTOR DISASTER: COURTS SHOULD 
ABANDON THE CIRCUIT TEST FOR DISTINGUISHING 
GOVERNMENT SPEECH FROM PRIVATE SPEECH 
Lilia Lim 
Abstract: A recent addition to First Amendment jurisprudence, the government-speech 
doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court to insulate government speech from certain 
First Amendment challenges. Broadly, the doctrine rests on the notion that when the 
government speaks for itself, it may say what it wishes. Recently, government entities facing 
claims of viewpoint discrimination against speech have asserted a government-speech 
defense, claiming that their viewpoint-based actions were justifiable because they were not 
regulating private speech but speaking for themselves. Several federal courts deciding these 
cases have applied a circuit-developed, four-factor test to determine whether the speech at 
issue was private speech or government speech. This test looks at the following factors: (1) 
the central purpose of the program in which the speech occurs, (2) the degree of editorial 
control exercised over the speech by the government or by private parties, (3) the identity of 
the literal speaker, and (4) whether the government or private parties bear the ultimate 
responsibility for the speech. 
This Comment argues, for two principal reasons, that courts should abandon the four-
factor test for distinguishing government speech from private speech. First, in the face of the 
inherent malleability of the factors, courts applying the test have failed to produce a 
principled and consistent approach that guides future courts. Second, an application of the 
test to Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme Court’s original government-
speech case, yields a result contrary to the Court’s decision. This Comment does not propose 
an alternative to the four-factor test, but does suggest that courts, in fashioning a new 
approach, should adhere to the principles underlying two distinct lines of Supreme Court 
cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
What began as a system to facilitate the efficient identification of 
vehicles has in many states become a carnival of expression, as drivers 
maneuver the roads in vehicles bearing license plates with a myriad of 
messages and designs. “Specialty” license plates—those bearing 
background designs and messages different from those on standard-issue 
plates1—are now available in all states.2 States’ regulation of their 
                                                     
1. “Specialty” plates differ from “vanity” plates, which feature number-and-letter configurations 
chosen by drivers. An example of a specialty plate is Illinois’ “America Remembers” plate, which 
features the text “America Remembers” and “September 11, 2001” against a background design of 
the American flag. CyberDriveIllinois, America Remembers, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/ 
departments/vehicles/license_plate_guide/specialty_plates/america_remembers.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2008) (“America Remembers” specialty plate), permanent copy available at 
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specialty-plate programs has aroused controversy and litigation, as 
private parties argue that the states discriminated based on viewpoint in 
approving, denying, or modifying certain plates.3 States respond by 
arguing that specialty plates constitute the states’ own speech, not 
private speech.4 These cases are quintessential examples of private 
parties and government laying claim to the same speech. 
While the Supreme Court has explained some of the things 
government can do when it is speaking,5 it has not clearly explained how 
to tell whether government is speaking in the first place.6 Identifying the 
speaker is important because government’s regulation of private speech 
is subject to First Amendment principles that do not apply when it 
speaks for itself.7 Grappling with this lack of clarity, courts in several 
circuits have applied a four-factor test to analyze the provenance of 
speech.8 
                                                     
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n1.pdf. An example of a vanity plate 
might be the text “USA-911” on a standard-issue background.  
2. See ANNE TEIGAN & NICHOLAS FARBER, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
TRANSPORTATION REVIEW: MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION AND LICENSE PLATES 22–25 (2007), 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/transportation/license-registration07.pdf, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n2.pdf. The number of 
specialty-plate designs offered by states varies significantly, from as few as five to more than seven 
hundred. See id. 
3. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2008); Planned 
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 787–88 (4th Cir. 2004); Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 614 
(4th Cir. 2002); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-CV-04316, 2007 WL 178455, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 19, 2007); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703–04 (E.D. La. 2003), vacated on 
other grounds, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). 
4. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 792; White, 2007 WL 178455, at *3; Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 
No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 WL 2412811, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005), rev’d, 515 F.3d 956 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Henderson, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 713. 
5. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
6. See SCV, 288 F.3d at 618 (“No clear standard has yet been enunciated in our circuit or by the 
Supreme Court for determining when the government is ‘speaking’ and thus able to draw 
viewpoint-based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus unable to do so.”). 
7. See infra note 38; see also Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he School District engaged in government speech and . . . its speech did not implicate 
the First Amendment or [plaintiff’s] First Amendment rights.”); SCV, 288 F.3d at 618 (“[E]ven 
ordinarily impermissible viewpoint-based distinctions drawn by the government may be sustained 
where the government itself speaks or where it uses private speakers to transmit its message.”). 
8. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965–68 (applying four-factor test to decide that specialty license plate 
was private speech); Rose, 361 F.3d at 793–94 (Choose Life message on specialty plate constituted 
hybrid of government and private speech); SCV, 288 F.3d at 619–21 (logo restriction on specialty 
plate of Sons of Confederate Veterans regulated private speech); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 
F.3d 995, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2002) (Ten Commandments monument on city property was private 
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This Comment argues that federal courts should abandon the test. Its 
factors are inherently malleable, and the emerging case law has not 
clarified their meanings. Courts cannot apply the test in a consistent and 
predictable manner to future cases. Moreover, it produces outcomes 
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.  
Because cases in which government invokes the government-speech 
defense almost always implicate government property or 
instrumentalities, Part I provides a brief overview of public-forum 
principles. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court’s government-speech 
cases, while Part III describes a different line of cases, those in which 
the Court has held that government may make content-based decisions 
about private speech that it will make available to the public. Part IV 
describes the origins of the four-factor test and how courts have applied 
it. Finally, Part V argues that courts should stop using the four-factor test 
for distinguishing government speech from private speech. While this 
Comment does not suggest an alternative approach, it argues that courts 
should adhere to the principles underlying two distinct lines of cases as 
they formulate a different approach. 
I.  GOVERNMENT MUST MAINTAIN VIEWPOINT 
NEUTRALITY IN FORUMS FOR PRIVATE SPEECH 
People often express themselves on government property—they may, 
for example, distribute literature on public sidewalks9 or produce plays 
in government-owned theaters.10 And while this speech enjoys First 
Amendment protections, it “is not thereby accorded a guaranteed forum 
on all property owned by the State.”11 Government uses its property to 
accomplish many different purposes—some that are amenable to all 
speakers, some that can accommodate certain conversations but not 
                                                     
speech); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141–42 (10th Cir. 2001) (sign listing 
private sponsors of public holiday display constituted government speech); White, 2007 WL 
178455, at *4–7 (message on specialty plates constituted private speech); Stanton, 2005 WL 
2412811, at *3–6 (specialty plates were government speech); Chiras v. Miller, No. 3:03-CV-02651, 
2004 WL 1660388, at *6–8 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2004) (classroom use of textbook was not pure 
government speech), aff’d on different grounds, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005); Henderson, 265 F. 
Supp. 2d at 715–17 (specialty plates were private speech); Cimarron Alliance Found. v. City of 
Okla. City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257–59 (W.D. Okla. 2002) (city’s banner program constituted 
government speech). 
 9. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 173 (1983).  
10. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547–548 (1975). 
11. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).  
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others, and some that are inconsistent with any right of speech access 
whatsoever. When government restricts speech that takes place on its 
property or through its instrumentalities, courts apply public-forum 
principles to determine whether those restrictions are constitutional.12 
The Supreme Court has recognized three categories of forums for 
speech: traditional public forums, designated public forums (with its 
sub-category of limited public forums),13 and nonpublic forums.14 While 
speakers’ protections differ depending on which type of forum is 
involved, government may not discriminate based on viewpoint in any 
forum.15 
Traditional public forums are properties such as “streets and parks 
which . . . time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”16 Government may place reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions on speech in traditional public forums if they are viewpoint-
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and leave open ample alternative channels for communication.17 
Content-based regulations of speech are permissible if they serve a 
compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to achieve that end.18 
Designated public forums consist of property not historically devoted 
to public expression, but which government has opened for that 
purpose.19  For example, courts have described university meeting 
                                                     
12. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (“[T]he extent 
to which the Government can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.”). For 
more extensive overviews of the public-forum doctrine, see 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & 
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 8:1–52 (2007), and RUSSELL L. WEAVER & DONALD E. 
LIVELY, UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 116–24 (2d. ed. 2006). 
13. Courts sometimes express confusion about the difference between limited public forums and 
nonpublic forums. See, e.g., Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1062 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000); 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giuliani, 105 F. Supp. 2d 294, 307 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). At least one court explained that general access indicates a designated public forum, while 
selective access indicates a non-public forum. Warren v. Fairfax County, 169 F.3d 190, 205 (4th 
Cir. 1999) (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679–80 (1998)). 
14. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (describing 
“[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication”). 
15. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles 
(SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 616 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995), for the proposition that viewpoint discrimination is 
presumptively impermissible in all forums for private speech). 
16. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (internal quotation omitted). 
17. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
18. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
19. Id. 
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facilities20 and municipal theaters as designated public forums.21 The 
same requirements that apply to traditional public forums govern 
designated public forums, but government retains the right to modify the 
designated public forum’s use or close it altogether.22 
Limited public forums, a type of designated public forum, are devoted 
to particular conversations—for use by certain groups or for the 
discussion of certain topics.23 Limited public forums have been 
recognized in school facilities opened to after-school use by various 
social and civic groups in the community,24 and in university funding for 
student publications.25 In these forums, the government “has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”26 But that power does not include the right to discriminate 
against disfavored viewpoints; while the government may exclude 
speakers who wish to address subjects not under discussion, it may not 
prohibit speakers from offering their opinions about an otherwise 
permitted subject.27 
Nonpublic forums include all other government property,28 with the 
caveat that some properties are not classified as forums at all.29 
                                                     
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1981). The Court explained in a later case that 
Widmar involved a designated public forum. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 
666, 679 (1998) (“[T]he government creates a designated public forum when it makes its property 
generally available to a certain class of speakers, as the university made its facilities generally 
available to student groups in Widmar.”). 
21. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975). 
22. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46 (“Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open 
character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a 
traditional public forum.”). 
23. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
24. Id. 
25. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
26. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 
(1966)). 
27. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
28. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
29. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–73 (1998) (“[T]he public 
forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical way to the very different context of public 
television broadcasting. . . . In the case of television broadcasting, . . . broad rights of access for 
outside speakers would be antithetical, as a general rule, to the discretion that stations and their 
editorial staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”); Nat’l 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585–88 (1998) (explaining that program awarding 
arts funding under competitive criteria differed from program in Rosenberger, where the 
government had created a limited public forum). For a discussion of Forbes and Finley, see infra 
Part III. 
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Examples of nonpublic forums are the Combined Federal Campaign (an 
annual fundraising drive allowing approved charitable groups to solicit 
donations)30 and a school’s internal mail system.31 Restrictions on 
speech in nonpublic forums are subject to the same rules that apply to 
limited public forums:32 they must be reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum.33 Furthermore, although government may restrict 
the subject matter of speech, it may not exclude speakers based on 
viewpoint.34 
Public-forum principles are frequently implicated in cases where 
government invokes a government-speech defense against claims of 
viewpoint discrimination, because the disputed speech often takes place 
on government property or through government instrumentalities.35 
Typically, the plaintiff argues that the government has created a forum 
by making its property available to private speakers,36 while the 
government claims the speech as its own, contending that it has not 
created a forum to which the plaintiff is entitled access.37 While public-
forum principles apply when private speech takes place on government 
property, they do not apply to the government’s own speech.38 
                                                     
30. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 805. 
31. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
32. Id. at 46 (“[T]he state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”). 
33. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
34. See id. 
35. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819; Page v. Lexington County Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 275 (4th 
Cir. 2008); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Am. Civil Liberties 
Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006); People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
36. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 15, Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (No. 05-16971), 2006 WL 3032960 
(arguing that state’s license plates were a designated public forum); Appellants’ Brief at 24, Page, 
531 F.3d 275 (No. 07-1697), 2007 WL 2988073 (arguing school district created forum through web 
site linking to third-party sites). 
37. See, e.g., Appellees’ Answering Brief at 12–31, Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (No. 05-16971), 2006 
WL 2983500 (arguing that Arizona’s special organization plates were government speech and a 
nonpublic forum from which exclusion of Life Coalition was reasonable and viewpoint-neutral); 
Response Brief for Appellee Lexington County School District One at 26–31, Page, 531 F.3d 275 
(No. 07-1697), 2007 WL 4114512 (arguing that school district did not create a forum and that web 
links to third-party sites constituted government speech). 
38. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000) (“Our 
decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its agents or 
employees, or—of particular importance—its faculty, are subject to the First Amendment analysis 
which controls in this case. Where the University speaks, either in its own name through its regents 
or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be 
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II. GOVERNMENT CAN FAVOR ITS OWN VIEWPOINT OVER 
OTHERS WHEN IT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF 
Government engages in speech activity to carry out its many 
functions.39 When government speaks, its “power to choose and tailor its 
message includes the discretion to promote policies and values of its 
own choosing free from forum analysis or the viewpoint-neutrality 
requirement.”40 Under the government-speech doctrine, government may 
express a preferred viewpoint, fund certain programs without funding 
others, and take certain measures to control its own message.41 That does 
not mean that all speech that is somehow supported by government is 
subject to the whims of the state. Government may not discriminate 
based on viewpoint when it facilitates private speech42 or encourages a 
diversity of speech from private speakers.43 
The origins of the government-speech doctrine lie in Rust v. 
Sullivan,44 a case involving congressional funding of family-planning 
services under Title X.45 Congress was willing to fund every family-
planning technique but one—abortion.46 A program restriction prevented 
a healthcare provider from answering a pregnant woman’s questions 
about abortion—for instance, if she asked where to get one.47 The 
                                                     
altogether different. The Court has not held, or suggested, that when the government speaks the 
rules we have discussed come into play.”) (citation omitted); Wells v. City & County of Denver, 
257 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2001) (“When the government speaks, either directly or through 
private intermediaries, it is constitutionally entitled to make ‘content-based choices’ and to engage 
in ‘viewpoint-based funding decisions.’” (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833, and Legal Services 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001), respectively)). But see W. Alexander Evans, 
Comment, License to Discriminate: “Choose Life” License Plates and the Government Speech 
Doctrine, 8 NEV. L.J. 765, 766 (2008) (suggesting that courts do not need to determine who is 
speaking when access to a forum is at issue); Alana C. Hake, Comment, The States, a Plate, and the 
First Amendment: The “Choose Life” Specialty License Plate as Government Speech, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 409, 447 (2007) (proposing a “forum-accountability” principle by which courts should 
determine whether states’ viewpoint-based actions are constitutional as “government speech”). 
39. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229; Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. 
Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 616–17 (4th Cir. 2002). 
40. W. Va. Ass’n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave, 512 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 
(S.D. W. Va. 2007) (internal citations omitted). 
41. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); SCV, 288 F.3d at 616–17. 
42. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–49. 
43. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
44. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
45. Id. at 177–78. 
46. See id. at 178. 
47. See id. at 180. 
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provider was permitted to say that “the project does not consider 
abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does 
not counsel or refer for abortion.”48 The Supreme Court upheld the 
regulations against the providers’ challenge that the regulations abridged 
their free-speech rights.49 The Court framed a Title X provider’s 
discussion with a pregnant patient as part of a larger government 
program that Congress had the right to shape.50 In effect, the provider’s 
speech was the government’s speech.51 The Court also pointed out that 
“[t]o hold that the Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program dedicated to 
advance certain permissible goals, because the program in advancing 
those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals, would render 
numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect.”52 The Court 
illustrated the principle with an example: Congress, in establishing a 
program to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, did 
not also have to fund a program encouraging communism and fascism.53 
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,54 the Court was faced with facts 
similar to those in Rust, but reached a very different conclusion, finding 
that Congress had discriminated against private speakers.55 Congress had 
allocated funds to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a federal 
nonprofit corporation, to provide legal assistance to indigent persons 
unable to afford representation.56 A program restriction prohibited 
funding of legal representation that involved an effort to amend or 
otherwise challenge existing welfare law.57 The Court found LSC’s 
argument—that Rust squarely governed the case58—unavailing.59 The 
                                                     
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 192. 
50. See id. at 193–94. 
51. Although the Rust opinion did not include the explicit language “government speech,” the 
Court later recognized that “the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to 
governmental speech . . . .” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001). 
52. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
53. Id. 
54. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
55. Id. at 537. 
56. Id. at 536. 
57. Id. at 536–37. 
58. Brief for Petitioner Legal Services Corp. at 24, Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 
(2001) (Nos. 99-603, 99-960), 2000 WL 772605. 
59. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–43. 
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Court unequivocally concluded that “[t]he advice from the attorney to 
the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be 
classified as governmental speech even under a generous understanding 
of the concept.”60 
The Court distinguished the facts before it from those in Rust. Unlike 
a doctor who received Title X funds so he or she could communicate the 
government’s message, the LSC-funded lawyer “[spoke] on the behalf of 
his or her private, indigent client.”61 Further, there was no 
“programmatic message” as there had been in Rust.62 Whereas Congress 
had communicated in Title X that it found birth preferable to abortion,63 
the regulation at issue in Velazquez contained no message; it was 
“designed to insulate the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution 
from judicial challenge.”64 
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,65 the 
Court considered whether the government-speech doctrine allows the 
State to discriminate based on viewpoint when it funds a diversity of 
speakers.66 A University of Virginia student organization seeking to 
publish a newspaper had sought funding from the university under a 
program that subsidized the printing costs of student groups.67 The 
University denied the funding request because the newspaper 
“promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an 
ultimate reality.”68 The Court rejected the government’s argument that 
Rust was controlling.69 It found that the university had created a 
“metaphysical” limited public forum by financing the fund,70 and that 
denying funding to the student organization amounted to viewpoint 
discrimination.71 The Court clarified that although the State may shape 
the contours of its own message,72 “[i]t does not follow . . . that 
                                                     
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 542. 
62. Id. at 548. 
63. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991). 
64. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548. 
65. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
66. See id. at 832–34. 
67. Id. at 822–27. 
68. Id. at 827. 
69. See id. at 833–34. 
70. Id. at 830. 
71. See id. at 845. 
72. Id. at 833. 
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viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not 
itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead 
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers.”73 
The differences in these cases’ outcomes, particularly between Rust 
and Velazquez, demonstrate how blurry the line is between government 
speech and private speech. Justice Scalia, in a sharp dissent in 
Velazquez, invoked stare decisis, writing that the LSC subsidy was 
“indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the subsidy upheld in 
Rust v. Sullivan”74 and that there was “no legitimate basis for declaring 
[the regulation] facially unconstitutional.”75 On the distinction the 
majority drew between the permissible government speech in Rust and 
the impermissible restriction on private speech in Velazquez, he wrote: 
If the private doctors’ confidential advice to their patients at 
issue in Rust constituted “government speech,” it is hard to 
imagine what subsidized speech would not be government 
speech. Moreover, the majority’s contention that the subsidized 
speech in these cases is not government speech because the 
lawyers have a professional obligation to represent the interests 
of their clients founders on the reality that the doctors in Rust 
had a professional obligation to serve the interests of their 
patients . . . which at the time of Rust we had held to be highly 
relevant to the permissible scope of federal regulation . . . . Even 
respondents agree that “the true speaker in Rust was not the 
government, but a doctor.”76 
These cases demonstrate the rough contours of the government-
speech doctrine. Government, when it is speaking through its own 
officials or through paid agents,77 can use public funds to promote its 
own policy and can regulate the content of its own speech.78 But it may 
                                                     
73. Id. at 834. 
74. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 558–59 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. at 559. 
76. Id. at 554 (citations omitted). 
77. See id. at 541 (recognizing the proposition in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of 
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995), that viewpoint-based funding decisions could be sustained in 
instances such as Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), where the government used private 
speakers to transmit specific information about its own program). 
78. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194); Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 616–
17 (4th Cir. 2002). 
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not discriminate against viewpoint when it facilitates private speech79 or 
encourages a diversity of views from private speakers.80 
III.  SOME PROGRAMS THAT REQUIRE GOVERNMENT TO 
SELECT AMONG PRIVATE SPEAKERS ARE NOT BOUND 
BY FORUM PRINCIPLES 
Government administers some programs that require it to choose 
between private speakers. A public broadcaster must choose between the 
many different programs offered to it by private producers. A public 
library, by selecting certain books, chooses not to include others. These 
types of programs, although implicating government property or 
instrumentalities, are not subject to forum principles (that is, they are not 
considered “forums” within the Court’s framework). 
In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,81 the 
Supreme Court said that public broadcasters were generally not subject 
to the public-forum principles of open access and viewpoint-neutrality 
because those principles are “antithetical, as a general rule, to the 
discretion that stations and their editorial staff must exercise to fulfill 
their journalistic purpose and statutory obligations.”82 The Court 
acknowledged that public stations favor some speakers over others but 
explained that such selection was unavoidable: “[A] broadcaster by its 
nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead of 
others.”83 
The Court’s analysis in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley84 
was similar. A group of artists brought a facial challenge to a provision85 
of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act86 that 
required the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to “tak[e] into 
consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse 
                                                     
79. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542–49. 
80. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
81. 523 U.S. 666 (1998). The Court held that although public broadcasting decisions were not 
generally subject to forum principles, candidate debates presented a narrow exception to that rule. 
The debate at issue was a nonpublic forum. Nonetheless, the Court held that the broadcaster’s 
exclusion of a political candidate was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of discretion.  
82. Id. at 673. 
83. Id. at 674. 
84. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
85. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2006). 
86. 20 U.S.C. §§ 951–60. 
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beliefs and values of the American public.”87 The artists argued that the 
requirement discriminated against any viewpoint that “fails to ‘respect’ 
the American public’s ‘beliefs and values’ or offends its ‘standards of 
decency.’”88 
The Court refused to apply forum analysis because the very nature of 
a highly selective grant program rendered “absolute neutrality . . . simply 
‘inconceivable.’”89 It rejected the artists’ argument that Rosenberger 
controlled the case.90 The University of Virginia’s funding program in 
Rosenberger was a “metaphysical” forum91 because it “indiscriminately 
‘encourage[d] a diversity of views from private speakers.’”92 The NEA’s 
funding, on the other hand, was allocated according to a competitive 
process, meaning the NEA had to select among private speakers to fulfill 
its mandate “to make esthetic judgments.”93 
Finally, government can exercise discretion when it operates public 
libraries. In United States v. American Library Ass’n94 (ALA), a plurality 
of the Court analyzed, under the principles of Forbes and Finley, 
libraries’ exercise of judgment in deciding what materials to purchase 
for their patrons:95 
Just as forum analysis and heightened judicial scrutiny are 
incompatible with the role of public television stations and the 
role of the NEA, they are also incompatible with the discretion 
that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional 
missions. Public library staffs necessarily consider content in 
making collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in 
                                                     
87. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (quoting 20 U.S.C.            
§ 954(d)(1)). Congress had passed § 954(d)(1), which amended the earlier version of the statute, 
after “[t]wo provocative works . . . prompted public controversy.” Id. at 574. The University of 
Pennsylvania used NEA funding to host a retrospective of Robert Mapplethorpe’s photography, 
which “included homoerotic photographs that several Members of Congress condemned as 
pornographic.” Id. Artist Andres Serrano used his NEA grant to subsidize “Piss Christ,” a 
photograph of a crucifix immersed in urine. Id. 
88. Respondents’ Brief at 21, Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (No. 97-371), 1998 WL 47281. 
89. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795–96 
(1st Cir. 1976)). 
90. Id. at 586. 
91. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
92. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834). 
93. Id. 
94. 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which required 
public libraries to use internet filters as a condition of receiving federal funding, did not violate the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
95. Id. at 204–05. 
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making them.96 
Finley, Forbes, and ALA involved programs that, because they require 
government to limit access and select some speakers to the exclusion of 
others, are incompatible with public-forum principles. But the Court in 
Finley pointed out that while the arts-funding program was insulated 
from forum principles, a plaintiff might prevail in an as-applied 
challenge by showing that the NEA had denied funding because of 
“invidious viewpoint discrimination.”97 
IV.  FEDERAL COURTS HAVE USED A FOUR-FACTOR TEST TO 
DISTINGUISH GOVERNMENT SPEECH FROM PRIVATE 
SPEECH 
The Supreme Court has yet to announce a clear method to determine 
“when the government is ‘speaking’ and thus able to draw viewpoint-
based distinctions, and when it is regulating private speech and thus 
unable to do so.”98 Without clear guidance, lower courts distinguishing 
government speech from private speech have used a four-factor test.99 
The four factors are: (1) the central purpose of the program in which the 
speech in question occurs, (2) the degree of editorial control exercised 
by government or private entities over the content of the speech, (3) the 
identity of the literal speaker, and (4) whether government or private 
entities ultimately bear responsibility for the content of the speech.100 
A.  The Four-Factor Test Emerged from an Eighth Circuit Case that 
Was Later Limited to the Broadcasting Context 
The four-factor test was assembled from the analysis of a decision 
involving a claim of viewpoint-based exclusion of speech from a radio 
broadcasting program. In Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the 
                                                     
96. Id. at 205. 
97. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. 
98. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles 
(SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 
1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance as to what 
constitutes government speech. As noted, we are aware of only one case, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173 (1991), in which the Court actually applied the principles that underlie the government speech 
doctrine.”) (parallel citation omitted). 
99. See cases cited supra note 8. 
100. SCV, 288 F.3d at 618. 
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University of Missouri101 (KKK), the Klan wished to participate in an 
underwriting program of a publicly owned radio station, KWMU, which 
would have required the station to identify the group as a sponsor during 
programming.102 The Klan had proposed that the acknowledgement 
announce, “The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian 
organization, standing up for rights and values of White Christian 
America since 1865. . . . Let your voice be heard!”103 When the station 
denied the Klan’s offer to underwrite programming, the group filed suit, 
claiming it was excluded from a speech forum because of its 
viewpoint.104 
The KKK court applied the Forbes principle that forum rules do not 
generally apply to public broadcasters.105 In reaching its decision, the 
court rejected the Klan’s argument that the announcements of 
underwriters’ identities constituted the private speech of the identified 
sponsors, and held that the announcements were the University’s speech: 
First and foremost, KWMU’s underwriting acknowledgments 
constitute governmental speech on the part of [University of 
Missouri, St. Louis]. Contrary to appellants’ contentions, the 
central purpose of the enhanced underwriting program is not to 
promote the views of the donors, but to acknowledge “any 
money, service, or other valuable consideration . . . directly or 
indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by” the 
station with respect to the broadcast of any matter. In other 
words, KWMU’s underwriting announcements are federally-
mandated sponsorship identifications, in which UMSL “speaks” 
by airing its acknowledgments of funds received from certain 
parties to pay for specific KWMU broadcasts. Because KWMU 
must by law publicly advise its listeners as to the sources of 
funds “accepted” for its broadcasts, UMSL’s decision to accept 
or reject the funds of underwriters is itself a governmental 
decision to speak or remain silent. As speaker, UMSL exercises 
control not only over the decision to accept or reject the 
donations, but also over the form and content of the 
announcements themselves. KWMU staff members compose, 
edit, and review acknowledgment scripts to insure compliance 
                                                     
101. 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000). 
102. Id. at 1088–89. 
103. Id. at 1089. 
104. See id. at 1090–91. 
105. Id. at 1093. 
LIM 1109.DOC 1/4/2009  3:42 PM 
Four-Factor Disaster 
583 
with both FCC and internal guidelines. Moreover, the station 
does not broadcast “pre-produced” announcements submitted by 
underwriters; instead, KWMU employees themselves read the 
acknowledgments on air. Finally, as speaker and licensee, 
UMSL is ultimately responsible for all of its broadcast material, 
including the underwriting announcements, and is subject to 
sanctions for failure to comply with its legal obligations. As 
appellees point out, “[i]t would be anomalous to impose these 
penalties on a station for any speech other than its own.”106 
The Eighth Circuit later limited its government-speech analysis in 
KKK to the public-broadcasting context. Robb v. Hungerbeeler107 
involved the Klan’s attempts to participate in Missouri’s Adopt-A-
Highway program.108 The State denied the application.109 It argued that 
the program involved only government speech because the State 
composed and placed the signs identifying the groups that adopted 
stretches of highway.110 Further, it argued that the Adopt-A-Highway 
program was similar in relevant respects to the radio underwriting 
program in KKK.111 
This time, however, the Eighth Circuit rejected Missouri’s 
government-speech defense.112 The court explained that the issues were 
fundamentally different from those in KKK, which “rest[ed] largely on 
the unique context of public broadcasting, in which editorial discretion 
to select programming and sponsors looms large.”113 The Eighth Circuit 
has not applied the four-factor KKK analysis in any other case. 
B.  Federal Courts Began Using the Four-Factor Test After It Was 
Assembled by the Tenth Circuit in Wells v. City & County of 
Denver 
In Wells v. City & County of Denver,114 the Tenth Circuit announced a 
four-factor test that it had assembled from KKK, and applied the test to 
                                                     
106. Id. at 1093–94 (internal citations omitted). 
107. 370 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2004). 
108. Id. at 737–38. 
109. Id. at 738. 
110. Id. at 744. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 744–45. 
113. Id. at 744 (quoting Cuffley v. Mickes, 208 F.3d 702, 706 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
114. 257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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facts involving a Christmas display on the steps of the City and County 
Building.115 The court held that a sign wishing visitors “Happy 
Holidays” and listing private sponsors of a public holiday display was 
government speech, meaning the Denver government could maintain the 
display without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate the 
messages of other parties.116 
Federal courts in five circuits have since used the four-factor test in 
various cases to determine whether government or private parties were 
speaking.117 In Chiras v. Miller,118 a district court in the Fifth Circuit 
applied the test to a school’s use of textbooks, holding that the speech 
was not pure government speech but speech that bore the imprimatur of 
the government.119 In Summum v. City of Ogden,120 the Tenth Circuit 
held that a Ten Commandments monument displayed on the lawn 
outside of the City’s municipal building was private speech under the 
four-factor test.121 Thus, the City could display the Ten Commandments 
monument only if it also displayed the monuments of other religious 
groups.122 In Cimarron Alliance Foundation v. City of Oklahoma City,123 
                                                     
115. See id. at 1139–42. 
116. Id. at 1143. 
117. See cases cited supra note 8. Even in circuits that have applied the four-factor test, courts 
have not consistently used it in all cases to distinguish government speech from private speech. In 
PMG International Division L.L.C. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit 
held that the federal government’s ban on the sale or rental of sexually explicit materials on 
Department of Defense property regulated private speech, not government speech exempt from 
public-forum analysis under Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 
(1998). Id. at 1169. The court reasoned that the facts were distinguishable from those in Forbes, 
where the property was exempt from public-forum analysis because of “policy considerations 
specifically associated with public broadcasting.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). See also Chiras v. 
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Because we conclude that the selection of curricular 
materials by the [School Board] is clearly government speech based on the principles applied by the 
Supreme Court in Rust, Rosenberger, Forbes, Finley, and ALA, we need not adopt this multi-factor 
test in order to resolve this dispute. However, we note that the application of the test in this case 
produces a result consistent with our conclusion.”). The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause the 
Board must necessarily exercise its editorial discretion in selecting which private entities will 
convey the message the state selects, forum analysis and the viewpoint neutrality requirement are 
inapposite in this case.” Id. at 615. 
118. No. 3:03-CV-02651, 2004 WL 1660388 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2004), aff’d on different 
grounds, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005). 
119. Id. at *6–8. Two out of four factors weighed in favor of the use of the textbooks to be pure 
government speech. Id. at *6–7. The court found that the School Board had nonetheless acted within 
its discretion in rejecting the plaintiff’s textbook. Id. at *13. 
120. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002). 
121. Id. at 1004–06. 
122. Id. at 1011. 
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a district court applied the four-factor test to the City’s practice of 
allowing banners to be displayed on its utility poles.124 That court held 
the banners were private speech.125 The four-factor test has also been 
used by several federal courts analyzing specialty-plate cases, to decide 
whether states’ viewpoint-based actions regarding specialty plates were 
permissible under the government-speech doctrine.126 
V.  COURTS SHOULD ABANDON THE FOUR-FACTOR TEST 
Courts should abandon the four-factor test as a method of 
distinguishing government speech from private speech. The factors 
themselves are inherently nebulous and susceptible to manipulation, 
failing to direct judicial decision-making, and case law has failed to 
clarify their meanings. The inconsistent results produced by the four-
factor test are especially apparent in specialty-plate cases, as courts have 
reached different conclusions in cases with strikingly similar facts. 
Moreover, the test leads to results inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent; a four-factor analysis of the speech involved in Rust v. 
Sullivan127 yields a finding of private speech. 
A.  Courts Have Failed to Clarify How to Apply the Malleable Factors 
of the Test in a Uniform and Consistent Manner 
The first factor—regarding the central purpose of the program in 
which the speech occurs128—raises a host of questions. What is the 
breadth of the “program” courts should consider? What if a program 
appears to contain manifold purposes that appear equally “central”—
which one should govern? What if there does not appear to be any 
definable “program” in which the speech takes place? Once a central 
purpose is identified, what determines the result the factor should favor? 
                                                     
123. 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Okla. 2002). 
124. Id. at 1257–59. 
125. Id. at 1259. 
126. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–68 (9th Cir. 2008); Planned 
Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793–94 (4th Cir. 2004); Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (SCV), 288 F.3d 610, 619–
21 (4th Cir. 2002); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-CV-04316, 2007 WL 178455, at *4–7 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007); Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 WL 2412811, 
at *3–6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005), rev’d, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008). 
127. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
128. SCV, 288 F.3d at 618. 
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Courts have failed to define how these issues should be resolved 
consistently. From the outset, courts approach the central-purpose factor 
in different ways. Some courts ask what the central purpose of a 
program is, irrespective of whether that purpose directly involves 
speech.129 For example, one court found that the central purpose of a 
state’s specialty-license-plate program was to produce revenue.130 Other 
courts approach the factor by asking whether the central purpose of a 
program is to promote a governmental message or to promote private 
expression.131 This approach assumes that the central purpose of a 
program is to promote some sort of expression, rather than to achieve 
some substantive goal via that expression. 
Courts apply the central-purpose factor even where they acknowledge 
that it is unclear,132 often considering facts more appropriately analyzed 
under the editorial-control factor. One court explained that the purpose 
of a city’s banner program was not apparent,133 but nonetheless engaged 
in an analysis by pointing out that the program allowed private donors to 
express their messages or goals.134 Because the private donors exercised 
complete control over banners, the court found the central-purpose factor 
to weigh in favor of private speech.135 In another case, the Tenth Circuit 
considered “the City’s complete control over the sign’s construction, 
message, and placement” when deciding the central-purpose factor.136 
Second, courts have failed to shape a consistent approach to the 
editorial-control factor, which purports to examine whether the 
government or the private speaker fashioned the speech’s message.137 
But what counts as “editorial control”? How much editorial discretion is 
necessary? At what stage in the process of “speaking” must that 
discretion be exercised? 
Some courts focus on identifying the party with whom the idea for 
                                                     
129. See id. (inquiring into “the central ‘purpose’ of the program in which the speech in question 
occurs”); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 715 (E.D. La. 2003) (asking “what is the 
central ‘purpose’ of the program in which the speech in question occurs”). 
130. SCV, 288 F.3d at 619. 
131. See Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2002); Cimarron Alliance 
Found. v. City of Okla. City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1257 (W.D. Okla. 2002). 
132. SCV, 288 F.3d at 619; Cimarron, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1257. 
133. Cimarron, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1257. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 1257–58. 
136. Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001). 
137. See SCV, 288 F.3d at 618. 
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speech originated, finding this factor to weigh in favor of that party.138 
Some courts require the government, in order for this factor to weigh in 
favor of government speech, to be actively involved in editing the 
substantive content of speech; it is not enough for the government to 
simply have approval authority over the speech submitted by private 
parties.139 On the other hand, one court found that the government could 
claim speech as its own so long as it possessed the power to “to 
implicitly accept or explicitly reject various portions” of a message.140 
Courts’ applications of the literal-speaker factor are equally divergent 
and reveal the problems with turning the Eighth Circuit’s KKK analysis 
into a test that applies to other factual contexts. KKK involved a radio 
station,141 which always features a literal speaker. In other factual 
contexts, though, it is often impossible to identify a literal speaker. For 
instance, when the speech at issue is the design and message on a 
specialty license plate, is a license plate a literal speaker?142 Is the owner 
of a car a literal speaker of the message on a license plate?143 Is a city 
literally speaking by permitting the display of a monument on its 
property?144 The answer to these questions, of course, is “no”—unless 
“literal” is used in a non-literal sense.  
Struggling to answer these questions, some courts render this factor 
redundant or meaningless by looking at other considerations. One court 
looked at the content of the speech—a consideration not belonging under 
any of the factors: “In this case, the banners clearly displayed [the 
private organization’s] logo on them, as well as that of a sponsor; there 
is nothing which portrays the name of Oklahoma City on them. For 
                                                     
138. See Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2008); Planned Parenthood 
of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004). 
139. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 966; SCV, 288 F.3d at 620–21; Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 
2d 699, 716 (E.D. La. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005); Cimarron 
Alliance Found. v. City of Okla. City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (W.D. Okla. 2002); Fleming v. 
Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (D. Colo. 2001). 
140. See Chiras v. Miller, No. 3:03-CV-02651, 2004 WL 1660388, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 
2004), aff’d on different grounds, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005) However, the court expressed that its 
standard was analyzing the “the extent of control exercised over the internal content of adopted 
textbooks, not the extent of control over the actual decision to adopt a textbook.” Id. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 101–106. 
142. See, e.g., SCV, 288 F.3d at 621; Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 
WL 2412811, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2005), rev’d, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008). 
143. See, e.g., Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-CV-04316, 2007 WL 178455, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 19, 2007). 
144. See, e.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1004 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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instance, a different conclusion would be warranted if the banners stated 
somewhere ‘Sponsored by the City of Oklahoma City.’”145 The court 
then engaged in analysis that seems more suited to the editorial-control 
factor, finding that the City was not the literal speaker because the City 
could offer “no evidence that shows it exercises discretion as to the 
content of the banners.”146 
Courts have also failed to set guidelines on whether the literal speaker 
should be assessed when the speech is created, or when the speech is 
conveyed or displayed. The Summum court, admitting the identity of the 
literal speaker to be “less clear” in the context of a monument to the Ten 
Commandments,147 ultimately focused on the moment of creation and 
found that this factor weighed in favor of private speech: “We so 
conclude based upon recognition of the fact that the Eagles, free from 
any City control, composed the speech contained on the Monument—a 
fact underlined by the Monument’s explicit acknowledgment of the 
Eagles as the Monument’s creators.”148 Other courts assessed the literal 
speaker at a point after the speech was created—when it was displayed. 
Courts in specialty-plate cases have identified the literal speaker as the 
private vehicle owners who display the plates on their cars, long after the 
plates have been designed, approved, and produced.149 
Finally, the ultimate-responsibility factor also reveals the inherent 
problems with creating a test from the factors used to decide a public-
broadcasting case. The KKK court pointed out that the radio station was 
“ultimately responsible for all of its broadcast material, including the 
underwriting announcements, and [was] subject to sanctions for failure 
to comply with its legal obligations.”150 Again, this made sense in the 
broadcasting context of KKK, where the radio station was strictly liable 
for the content of its broadcasting. But in cases where there are no such 
legal consequences, what does it mean to be “ultimately responsible” for 
                                                     
145. Cimarron Alliance Found. v. City of Okla. City, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (W.D. Okla. 
2002). 
146. Id. (emphasis added). 
147. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1004. 
148. Id. at 1004–05. 
149. See Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004); Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm’n of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles (SCV), 288 
F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-CV-04316, 2007 WL 
178455, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 717 (E.D. La. 
2003), vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). 
150. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085, 1094 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
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speech? And should ultimate responsibility be assessed before or after 
the speech takes place? 
In trying to apply this factor, some courts look at who exercises 
dominion over speech after it has been created. In Summum, the court 
said that the fact that the City could have sold, given away, modified, or 
even destroyed the monument pointed to its being government speech 
under this factor.151 It equated ultimate responsibility with powers of 
disposition over the speech act. In Wells, the court determined the 
ultimate-responsibility factor weighed in favor of government speech 
because the City had assumed “full responsibility for providing security 
for the display, including a fence to guard against theft and protect 
citizens from possible electrical hazards, video cameras, motion 
detectors, and a security guard.”152 
Part of the Wells court’s analysis under the ultimate-responsibility 
factor appears tautological. It found that “this litigation is itself an 
indication that the City bears the ultimate responsibility for the content 
of the display.”153 But if that is true, this factor will always weigh in 
favor of government speech in these cases, where private parties 
asserting speech rights bring suit against the government. Such an 
analysis renders the factor pointless. 
In sum, the factors of the four-factor test are inherently malleable, and 
no clear rules have emerged from the case law. Instead, courts have 
applied various, conflicting approaches under each factor. Some of the 
problems stem from applying a test that was fashioned from a public-
broadcasting case to inapposite factual scenarios.  
B.  Courts Applying the Four-Factor Test Have Reached Opposite 
Outcomes in Cases with Similar Facts 
Specialty-plate cases illustrate the unpredictable results worked by the 
four-factor test.154 This Comment discusses cases that involve groups 
                                                     
151. Summum, 297 F.3d at 1005. 
152. Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citations 
omitted). 
153. Id. 
154. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965–68 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying 
test to find specialty license plates were private speech); Rose, 361 F.3d at 793–94 (Choose Life 
plate constituted hybrid of government and private speech); SCV, 288 F.3d at 619–21 (logo 
restriction on specialty plate of Sons of Confederate Veterans regulated private speech); 
White, 2007 WL 178455, at *4–7 (message on Illinois’s specialty plates was private speech); Ariz. 
Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 WL 2412811, at *3–6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 
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that unsuccessfully petitioned state governments for plates (either 
Choose Life or pro-choice plates) or opposed Choose Life plates when 
pro-choice plates were unavailable.155 The states argued that the speech 
at issue was government speech. The courts’ results under the test run 
the gamut: government, private and even “hybrid” speech—a category 
not recognized by the Supreme Court.156 
States’ specialty-plate programs are strikingly similar.157 The states 
whose actions were assessed under the four-factor test include Arizona, 
Illinois, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia. All five offer a 
diversity of plates featuring different organizations and causes—among 
                                                     
2005) (specialty plates were government speech), rev’d, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Henderson, 
265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 715–17 (E.D. La. 2003) (Louisiana’s specialty plates were private speech), 
vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005). 
One circuit court ruled that the government-speech issue was controlled by a Supreme Court 
decision, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375–77 (6th Cir. 2006). Courts and commentators have criticized 
the application of Johanns to specialty-plate cases. In a forceful dissent on the merits, Judge Martin 
argued that the majority erred in applying Johanns—a case about compelled subsidization of 
speech—to all First Amendment cases. Bredesen, 441 F.3d at 385 (Martin, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). See also Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that Johanns was factually distinguishable, but useful in conjunction with four-factor 
test); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-CV-04316, 2007 WL 178455, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 
2007) (describing Sixth Circuit’s application of Johanns as “forced”); Saumya Manohar, Comment, 
Look Who’s Talking Now: “Choose Life” License Plates and Deceptive Government Speech, 25 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 230 (2006) (explaining that courts should not use Johanns to analyze 
whether government is speaking in Choose Life specialty-plate cases because that standard allows 
for deceptive government speech that distorts the marketplace of ideas and indoctrinates the public); 
Andy G. Olree, Specialty License Plates: Look Who’s Talking in the Sixth Circuit, 68 ALA. LAW. 
213, 214 (2007) (arguing that the Sixth Circuit ignored operative facts of Johanns in using it to 
analyze Choose Life plate). 
155. See supra note 3. 
156. See supra note 154. 
157. In some minor respects, the specialty-plate programs analyzed under the four-factor test 
differed. Arizona had a statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2404 (2004), under which groups 
meeting specified requirements could apply for their own specialty plates, and a license plate 
commission was required to authorize the plates if the organizations met certain statutory 
requirements. See Stanton, 515 F.3d at 961. In practice, Illinois and Louisiana required approval of 
individual plates by their respective state legislatures. See Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, No. 1:04-
CV-04316, 2007 WL 178455, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2007) (explaining that the Secretary of 
State, vested with authority to administer specialty-plate program, had a policy of requiring General 
Assembly to approve specialty plates); Henderson v. Stalder, 265 F. Supp. 2d 699, 712 (E.D. La. 
2003), vacated on other grounds, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[E]ach prestige license plate issued 
in Louisiana is permitted only by statute rather than by any administrative process.”). South 
Carolina had a statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-8000 (2004), under which nonprofit organizations 
could apply for plates, but the South Carolina State Legislature also passed legislation approving 
plates on a case-by-case basis. See Rose, 361 F.3d at 788. In any event, in all states there was a de 
facto method by which nongovernmental groups could work to obtain their own specialty plates. 
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them, colleges and universities (and fraternities and sororities), sports 
teams, professions, and military and veterans groups.158 Some plates 
support state causes, such as wildlife and public education.159 All five 
states also offer plates featuring the slogans and emblems of 
nongovernmental groups, like the Wildlife Conservation Council in 
Arizona,160 the Eagle Scouts in Illinois,161 the Knights of Columbus in 
Louisiana,162 the Sons of the Confederate Veterans in South Carolina,163 
and the Shriners in Virginia.164 States generally earmark a portion of the 
specialty-plate fee for the cause or organization featured on the plate.165 
The specialty-plate cases took place against the backdrop of Wooley 
                                                     
158. See Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., http://www.azdot.gov/mvd/vehicle/ 
mvdplate.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (Arizona specialty plates), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n158a.pdf; CyberDriveIllinois, Specialty 
License Plates, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/vehicles/license_plate_guide/ 
specialty_plates/home.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (Illinois specialty plates), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n158b.pdf; La. Office of 
Motor Vehicles, Louisiana Special Plate Display, http://omv.dps.state.la.us/Special%20Plates/ 
SpecialPlates_display.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (Louisiana specialty plates), permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n158c.pdf; S.C. Dep’t of 
Motor Vehicles,  SCDMV Online: Specialty Plates, http://www.scdmvonline.com/ 
VehPlateSpecialty.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (South Carolina specialty plates), permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n158d.pdf; Va. Dep’t of 
Moto r  V eh i c l e s ,  Co mmo nw e a l th  o f  V i rg in i a  Depa r t me n t  o f  Moto r  V e h ic l e s , 
http://www.dmv.state.va.us/webdoc/citizen/vehicles/plate_search.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) 
(Virginia specialty plates), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
notes/83washlrev569n158e.pdf. 
159. See id. 
160. Motor Vehicle Div., Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., http://www.azdot.gov/ 
mvd/vehicle/mvdplate.asp#WC (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (Wildlife Conservation specialty plate), 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n160.pdf. 
161. CyberDriveIllinois, Eagle Scout, http://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/departments/vehicles/ 
license_plate_guide/specialty_plates/eaglescout.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) (Eagle Scout 
specialty plate), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
83washlrev569n161.pdf. 
162. La. Office of Motor Vehicles, supra note 158. 
163. S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, supra note 158. 
164. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 
http://www.dmv.state.va.us/exec/vehicle/splates/info.asp?idnm=SHR (last visited Sept. 25, 2008) 
(Shriner specialty plate), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
83washlrev569n164.pdf. 
165. See supra note 158. For example, in Arizona, a portion of the White Mountain Apache Tribe 
plate goes to the Tribe for traffic control devices. http://www.azdot.gov/mvd/vehicle/ 
mvdplate.asp#WhiteMountain (last visited Sept. 25, 2008, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n165.pdf.). In Illinois, a portion of the 
Eagle Scout plate goes to the Boy Scout and Girl Scout Fund. CyberDriveIllinois, supra note 161. 
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v. Maynard,166 a First Amendment case involving license plates. New 
Hampshire made it a misdemeanor to knowingly obscure “the figures or 
letters on any number plate,”167 including the state motto—“Live Free or 
Die.”168 George Maynard, a Jehovah’s Witness, found the motto 
repugnant to his beliefs, so he covered it.169 After three convictions and 
fifteen days in jail, Maynard filed a civil-rights claim asking the federal 
courts to enjoin New Hampshire from prosecuting him.170 The Court 
implicitly held that messages on license plates involve private-speech 
interests, describing the statute as “forc[ing] an individual . . . to be an 
instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view 
he finds unacceptable.”171 
Relying in part on Wooley, courts in specialty-plate cases have 
applied the four-factor test to reach three different conclusions. In 
Arizona Life Coalition, Inc. v. Stanton,172 Life Coalition alleged that the 
State had denied its application for a plate because of the group’s pro-
life stance.173 The Ninth Circuit found that all four factors weighed in 
favor of private speech.174 The court agreed with Life Coalition that the 
program’s central purpose was to offer drivers the opportunity “to 
identify themselves with individualized messages” and “to benefit 
worthy organizations financially.”175 The editorial-control factor 
weighed in favor of private speech because “the idea of a ‘Choose Life’ 
license plate originated with Life Coalition.”176 The literal-speaker factor 
was a closer call—the government owned the plates, but Wooley 
indicated that messages on the plates implicated private-speech 
                                                     
166. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
167. Id. at 707 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (1975)). 
168. Id. (citing State v. Hoskin, 295 A.2d 454 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1972)). 
169. Id. at 707–08. 
170. Id. at 708–09. Maynard could have avoided time in jail by paying fines totaling $75, but he 
refused to pay them as a matter of conscience. Id. 
171. Id. at 715. The Court concluded that the State’s claimed interests in facilitating the 
identification of passenger vehicles and promoting an appreciation of history, individualism, and 
state pride did not outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to refuse to be a courier for the 
State’s message. Id. at 716–17. 
172. 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008). 
173. Brief of Appellants at 31–38, Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 05-16971), 2006 WL 3032960. 
174. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 965–68. The court supplemented the four-factor test with the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). See id. at 965. 
175. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
176. Id. at 966. 
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interests.177 The factor ultimately weighed in favor of private speech 
because Life Coalition’s logo, showing the faces of two young children, 
would be displayed on the license plate.178 Finally, Life Coalition bore 
ultimate responsibility for the speech because it had taken “the 
affirmative step of submitting an application.”179 
The Ninth Circuit’s finding of private speech reversed the district 
court, which found all four factors to weigh in favor of government 
speech.180 The district court had reasoned that because the license plates 
existed primarily to identify vehicles and their drivers, and “Arizona 
determine[d] the efficacy of license plate messages,” the program’s 
primary purpose weighed in favor of government speech.181 The State 
exercised editorial control by limiting participation to groups that met 
certain requirements.182 The district court analyzed the literal-speaker 
and ultimate-responsibility factors together, finding they weighed in 
favor of government speech because Arizona “control[led] the type of 
organization allowed and the substance that the organization trie[d] to 
promote.”183 
Finally, in Planned Parenthood of South Carolina, Inc. v. Rose,184 the 
Fourth Circuit considered a South Carolina statute that authorized pro-
life plates but not pro-choice plates.185 The court concluded that the 
plates constituted “hybrid speech”—a category not recognized by the 
Supreme Court.186 Judge M. Blane Michael analyzed the speech using 
the four-factor test, finding the primary-purpose and editorial-control 
                                                     
177. See id. at 966–67. 
178. See id. at 967. 
179. Id. at 968. 
180. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, No. 2:03-CV-01691, 2005 WL 2412811, at *3–6 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 26, 2005). 
181. See id. at *3–4. 
182. See id. at *4–5. 
183. Id. at *6. 
184. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004). 
185. Id. at 787–88. 
186. Each judge of the three-judge panel, writing separately, found that the plates were hybrid 
speech, although for different reasons. See id. at 787–801. See also Women’s Resource Network v. 
Gourley, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1161 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“It is pellucid that the speech on the license 
plates authorized by these statutes ‘is neither exclusively that of the private individuals nor 
exclusively that of the government, but, rather, hybrid speech of both.’” (quoting Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 
2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc))). 
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factors to weigh in favor of government speech,187 while the literal-
speaker and ultimate-responsibility factors fell on the private-speech side 
of the scale.188 The central purpose of the program was “to promote the 
State’s preference for the pro-life position.”189 The State exercised 
editorial control because the idea “originated with the State, and the 
legislature determined that the plate will bear the message ‘Choose 
Life.’”190 Judge Michael considered Wooley in analyzing the literal-
speaker factor, and concluded that “the specialty plate gives private 
individuals the option to identify with, purchase, and display one of the 
authorized messages.”191 The driver exercised ultimate control over the 
speech because “the private individual chooses to spend additional 
money to obtain the plate and display its pro-life message on her 
vehicle.”192 While the court could not agree on a rationale, it 
unanimously held that the statute violated the First Amendment.193 
C. The Four-Factor Test Applied to Rust v. Sullivan Produces a 
Result Inconsistent with Supreme Court Precedent 
An assessment of the facts of Rust v. Sullivan under the four-factor 
test produces a result inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in 
that case, the “fountainhead” of the government-speech doctrine.194 The 
Court has described Rust as relying upon a finding of government 
speech,195 but the four-factor test points to a finding of private speech. 
The application of the four-factor test in the facts of Rust is not 
straightforward for all factors, but the test can be applied to produce 
such a finding. 
At the outset, it is important to identify the precise speech at issue: 
counseling by recipient healthcare providers that touches upon 
                                                     
187. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 793 (4th Cir. 2004). 
188. Id. at 793–94. 
189. Id. at 793. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 794. 
192. Id. 
193. See id. at 799. 
194. Note, The Curious Relationship Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech 
Doctrines, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2411, 2411 (2004) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 
533, 541 (2001) and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) as 
“cases that have subsequently identified Rust as the fountainhead of the government speech 
doctrine”). 
195. See supra note 51. 
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abortion.196 The government gave providers broad discretion to counsel 
their patients on family-planning techniques but prohibited them from 
discussing abortion.197 The providers argued that the specific regulations 
proscribing abortion-related counseling violated their First Amendment 
rights,198 an argument the Court rejected.199 
Three of the four factors weigh in favor of private speech. First, the 
program’s central purpose weighs in favor of private speech. The 
legislation creating the program authorizes the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services “to assist in the establishment and operation of 
voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of 
acceptable and effective family planning methods and services 
(including natural family planning methods, infertility services, and 
services for adolescents).”200 Though this does not clearly weigh in favor 
of government speech or private speech, the central purpose of Title X 
does not have to do with supporting a specific government message. One 
court, where the central purpose did not clearly weigh in either direction 
but it was apparent that the central purpose was not to promote the views 
of the government, held that the factor weighed against finding 
government speech.201 
Second, the editorial-control factor weighs in favor of government 
speech. Although the government largely vests editorial control of 
family-planning techniques in the providers, the specific restriction on 
counseling regarding abortion constituted a strict control on the speech 
at issue.  
The literal-speaker factor weighs heavily in favor of private speech, 
because the literal speakers (in this case, they are identifiable) are the 
providers who counsel their patients. 
Finally, the ultimate-responsibility factor also weighs heavily in favor 
of private speech. Healthcare providers bear the ultimate responsibility 
for the counseling and care they give to their patients. They are bound to 
their patients by legal and ethical rules, and the federal government does 
                                                     
196. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991). See also discussion supra text 
accompanying notes 44–53. 
197. See id. at 178–81. 
198. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Rust, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (Nos. 89-1391, 89-1392), 1990 WL 
10012648. 
199. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192. 
200. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2005). 
201. See Chiras v. Miller, No. 3:03-CV-02651, 2004 WL 1660388, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 
2004). 
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not indemnify healthcare providers against suits arising under projects 
funded by Title X.202 
On balance, the factors weigh in favor of private speech, a result 
directly at odds with Supreme Court precedent. That the four-factor test 
can be applied to produce this result demonstrates its unreliability as a 
test to distinguish government speech from private speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The government-speech doctrine exists because government must 
speak to function. The Supreme Court has explained what government 
can do when it is speaking, but not how to tell whether it is speaking. 
Confronted with this lack of guidance, several federal courts have used a 
four-factor test born from one court’s analysis in a public-broadcasting 
case. Courts should abandon this test. Its factors are inherently 
malleable, and courts apply them inconsistently. It also produces a result 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent in one of the Court’s few 
government-speech cases, Rust v. Sullivan. 
This Comment does not propose an alternative means of assessing 
whether speech is government or private. But as courts work to craft a 
better approach, they must consider that distinct principles underlie two 
lines of cases. Rust, Velazquez, and Rosenberger articulate the rationale 
and some limits of the government-speech doctrine. Rust allows 
government to express its own viewpoint to the exclusion of others; 
Velazquez prohibits government from simultaneously facilitating and 
controlling private speech; and Rosenberger prohibits government from 
creating a forum for a diversity of private speakers and then excluding a 
speaker from that forum because of his or her viewpoint. Finley, Forbes, 
and ALA describe government programs not bound by forum 
principles—those programs that necessarily require government to 
choose between private speakers. Government officials administering 
those programs, however, are still subject to the First Amendment 
requirement of viewpoint-neutrality; they cannot discriminate against 
particular private speakers because of viewpoint. 
The distinction between the two lines of cases is important. Whereas 
the Rust line expressly pertains to the boundaries of government speech, 
the Finley line describes government programs that implicate private 
                                                     
202. Letter from Evelyn M. Kappeler, Acting Director, Office of Population Affairs, U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, to author (Oct. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev569n202.pdf. 
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speech. To illustrate, a finding that states’ specialty-plate programs 
constitute government speech under Rust is in error, because states have 
created programs that encourage the expression of a variety of views. 
And because the specialty-plate programs do not require that states 
select some speakers to the exclusion of others, they do not fall under the 
Finley line of cases, meaning they are subject to public-forum principles.  
The Finley line of cases does not permit the government to exercise 
viewpoint discrimination against speech, and it does not transform the 
relevant speech into “government speech” for First Amendment 
purposes. Any test for distinguishing government speech from private 
speech must adhere to these principles.  
